A Shocking Parliamentary Question That Stunned Canada
In a tense House of Commons committee hearing, a simple yet explosive question sent shockwaves across Canada’s immigration system:
“How did a convicted rapist, listed on the United Kingdom’s child-abuse registry, get a Canadian visitor visa?”
When the immigration minister tried to sidestep the query, the facts eventually surfaced — and they were disturbing.
The offender had moved from the UK to Spain in 2020. In 2023, he applied for a Canadian visitor visa, checked “No” on the form asking if he had ever been convicted of a crime, and was approved.
He entered Canada freely. Only after his arrival did Canadian authorities uncover his criminal past. The man has since been declared inadmissible and is being deported — but the damage to public confidence had already been done.
This exchange ignited the biggest immigration-screening controversy Canada has faced in years — exposing a system that heavily depends on applicants’ honesty despite collecting millions of biometric fingerprints and photos.
Canada’s Visitor Visa Boom: 5 Million Approvals in Three Years
Canada’s immigration department — Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) — has approved a record-breaking number of visitor visas between 2022 and 2025.
| Year | Visitor Visas (V-1 Counterfoil Only) |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 1,115,940 |
| 2023 | 1,758,525 |
| 2024 | 1,460,250 |
| 2025 (to Oct) | ~900,000 |
That’s over five million visitor visas in less than four years — a clear sign of Canada’s global openness. But with this growth comes an unavoidable risk: screening volume overload.
Each application is supposed to go through identity, security, and criminality checks. Yet, in practice, much of that process still relies on self-declaration — a system built on trust rather than proof.
How Visitor Visa Screening Works — and Where It Fails
Every visitor to Canada must go through four basic layers of screening:
1. Self-Declaration: The Honesty Test
Applicants must answer the question:
“Have you ever committed, been arrested for, been charged with, or convicted of any criminal offence in any country or territory?”
This step assumes that the applicant tells the truth. But if a person lies — and their criminal record is not in a database Canada can access — there’s virtually no way for the system to detect it.
2. Biometrics: Fingerprints and Photos
Since 2018, most temporary-resident applicants must submit fingerprints and a digital photo.
These are run through the RCMP’s Real Time Identification (RTID) system to check for matches against Canadian criminal and immigration databases.
But here’s the catch: those fingerprints are checked only within Canada and its close allies, not globally.
3. Information Sharing: Limited to the “Migration Five”
Canada shares immigration biometrics with only four allies — the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand — a group known as the Migration Five (M5).
Through these agreements, Canada can cross-check fingerprints for immigration or asylum records, but not full foreign criminal histories.
4. Officer Discretion: The Optional Police Certificate
Visa officers may request foreign police certificates if red flags appear in an application.
However, police certificates are not mandatory for visitor visas — only for permanent-resident applicants. This means that millions of short-term visitors are admitted without any verified criminal record check.
Biometrics Are About Identity, Not Criminal History
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) made this clear in its 2022–2024 reports:
“Biometrics are primarily an identity-verification tool. They do not automatically provide access to all foreign criminal records.”
In other words, fingerprints confirm who someone is, not what they’ve done abroad.
When IRCC collects fingerprints from, say, an Indian or Nigerian applicant, those prints are compared only to Canadian records and M5 partner databases.
There is no automatic link to India’s or Nigeria’s national criminal registries.
That loophole allows offenders from non-M5 countries to check “No” on their application and potentially pass undetected — unless flagged by intelligence sharing or Interpol.
The Case That Exposed the Gap
The parliamentary case that triggered outrage followed this exact scenario:
- The man was a convicted sex offender in the UK, later residing in Spain.
- He applied for a Canadian visitor visa in 2023.
- His fingerprints did not match any Canadian or M5 watch records.
- He answered “No” to having any convictions.
- The visa was approved.
- After arrival, his record surfaced, and a court ordered his deportation.
The immigration minister defended the process as “robust,” arguing that the system eventually worked.
But critics countered sharply: if a sex offender is caught after entry, the system didn’t work — it failed.
Biometrics’ Limits: What the Data Reveal
Government evaluations confirm that while biometrics improve identity verification, they remain weak for criminal detection.
| Period | Applicants Screened | Matches to Immigration Records | Matches to Criminal Records (Canada) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014–2017 | 1,283,203 | 204,338 (15.9%) | Partial/confidential data |
The RCMP’s RTID system effectively detects matches to prior immigration or Canadian criminal records — but foreign data availability remains the weak point.
That limitation still holds true in 2025.
Canada’s M5-Only Data Sharing: The Structural Flaw
Under the “High-Value Data Sharing Protocol,” Canada’s biometric data sharing extends only to M5 countries.
This network focuses on immigration records, not criminal registries.
So, if a Canadian visa officer checks biometrics for an applicant from India, the system verifies:
- RCMP databases (Canadian records), and
- M5 partner immigration databases.
It does not automatically check India’s police records or Interpol alerts unless triggered by suspicion.
That’s why a convicted offender from another country can pass through screening by simply lying.
2024–2025: Canada’s Attempted Fixes
Following the public backlash, IRCC introduced several reforms in 2024–2025:
- Migration-Integrity Reorganization: A new sector was formed to coordinate threat and fraud detection.
- Expanded Data Sharing: IRCC now claims to share data beyond the M5 “where bilateral agreements exist,” though no public list has been released.
- Officer Training: Enhanced modules to detect deception and high-risk patterns.
- Global VAC Network: 95% of applicants can now give biometrics locally, cutting identity fraud.
- Visa Cancellation Powers (2025 Regulation): Officers can revoke visas if inadmissibility is later discovered.
These steps improve efficiency but do not fully eliminate the core vulnerability: lack of real-time access to global criminal databases.
Expert Opinions: “We Know Who They Are, Not What They Did”
A former senior border officer summarized it best:
“Canada’s biometrics tell us whether we’ve seen that fingerprint before. They don’t tell us if another country has a conviction on record unless there’s a data-sharing pipeline.”
Immigration lawyers add that volume plus trust equals vulnerability.
With over 5 million approvals since 2022, even a 0.1% deception rate means thousands of potential high-risk entrants.
Criminologists agree this problem is not unique to Canada. Most Western nations face similar obstacles because privacy laws, data fragmentation, and national sovereignty limit access to criminal registries.
Why Canada Still Relies on Self-Declaration
The self-report system persists because of practicality.
Requiring verified police certificates for all visitors would:
- Add months to processing times.
- Create billions in extra administrative costs.
- Discourage tourism and business travel.
In short, IRCC chooses speed and accessibility over exhaustive checks — a deliberate policy trade-off between openness and security.
Parliamentary Backlash: “Robust Is Not Good Enough”
Opposition MPs pounced on the case, calling it proof that the government’s system was “anything but robust.”
They demanded urgent reforms, including:
- Mandatory foreign police certificates from G7 and Commonwealth nations.
- Real-time data-sharing on sex-offender registries.
- Annual public reporting on inadmissibility cases found post-entry.
Government MPs warned that such measures could paralyze the visa system and harm Canada’s reputation as a welcoming destination.
The immigration minister maintained that Canada’s “world-class biometric and intelligence systems” provide balanced protection — though public trust has clearly eroded.
How Canada Compares Internationally
United States
Uses the IDENT/HART system linked with multiple FBI and Homeland Security databases.
However, even the U.S. lacks automatic access to foreign conviction data without treaties.
United Kingdom
Requires police certificates for specific visa categories and runs checks through Interpol for flagged cases.
Australia & New Zealand
Share biometrics with Canada and M5 partners. Like Canada, they rely on self-disclosure for applicants outside allied jurisdictions.
So, while Canada’s model aligns with global standards, its sheer scale and geographic diversity of applicants make the weaknesses more significant.
Enforcement Outcomes: What the Numbers Show
According to IRCC and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), around 9,000 removal orders were issued in 2024, with roughly 1,200 linked to criminal inadmissibility.
However, the government does not specify how many of those cases began with visitor visas — a data gap critics say must be addressed.
Transparency advocates have called for annual breakdowns of:
- How many biometrics matched criminal files.
- How many false declarations were caught.
- How many removals resulted from visitor visa misuse.
How to Fix Canada’s Screening Weakness
Experts and policymakers have proposed several realistic improvements:
1. Expand Data-Sharing Agreements
Negotiate bilateral access to trusted national criminal registries (e.g., India, France, Japan). These treaties would function like specialized Interpol pipelines for visa processing.
2. Mandate Targeted Police Certificates
Instead of all applicants, require police certificates for:
- Male applicants aged 18–55 from countries with weak data-sharing.
- Anyone with multiple previous rejections.
- Long-stay visitor or work-permit applicants.
3. Integrate Real-Time Interpol Checks
Embedding Interpol’s I-24/7 API directly into visa systems would allow instant alerts for wanted or registered offenders.
4. Annual Screening Transparency Reports
Public reporting would boost confidence and accountability. Canadians deserve to know how effective the system truly is.
5. Public Education Campaigns
Explain what biometrics can and cannot do. Confusion fuels suspicion; clear communication builds trust.
Balancing Openness and Security
In recent statements, IRCC reaffirmed that:
- All applicants are screened for identity, security, and criminality.
- Multiple agencies — RCMP, CBSA, CSIS — collaborate to verify data.
- Misrepresentation leads to refusals and five-year bans.
- New cancellation powers allow swift action once inadmissibility is discovered.
The minister insists modernization will continue, aiming for “a balance between openness and safety.”
But as immigration levels soar — with 400,000 new permanent residents and millions of visitors annually — the margin for error grows smaller.
The Stakes: Trust, Safety, and Reputation
Canada’s global reputation as a welcoming, law-abiding nation depends on public trust in immigration controls.
While the current system is sophisticated, it remains incomplete. Biometrics are powerful for confirming who someone is, but not what they’ve done.
Until Canada gains real-time access to more global criminal data, the risk of dangerous individuals slipping through — however rare — will persist.
The parliamentary firestorm may yet prove a turning point, forcing Ottawa to finally close the gap between identity verification and criminal accountability.
Because in immigration — as in public safety — “almost secure” isn’t secure enough.
